Joseph Wiles v. Jean B. Wiles : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Joseph Wiles v. Jean B. Wiles : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Paul R. Frischknecht; Attorney for Appellee.
C. Robert Collins; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Joseph Wiles v. Jean B. Wiles, No. 920598 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3572
UTAH 
T'/'CUMENT 
K r U 
5?..-
J ) • 
DOCKET NO.. 
BRIEf 
J^5°\% 
IN THE 
COURT OP APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH WILES 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JEAN B . WILES 
Defendant -Appel lan t . 
Case No. 92^4-59-CA 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgement of the 
Sixth Judicial Court of Sanpete County 
Honorable Don V, Tibbs, Judge 
PAUL R. FRISCHKNECHT (1129) 
50 North Main Street 
Manti, Utah 84642 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellee 
C. ROBERT COLLINS (5455) 
405 East State Road 
P.O. Box 243 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
Argument Priority: (16) Any 
matter not included within other 
categories. 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
JAN 2 6 1993 
' ^ / "Mary T. Noonan 
Y Clerk of th© Court Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 6 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 6 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED . . 7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 13 
ARGUMENT 15 
POINT I. THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION CANNOT BE USED TO 
DEFEAT THE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS AWARDED IN A 
DIVORCE PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO 
MAKE AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY . . . 15 
POINT II. THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS A PROPER 
PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF A LIEN CREATED BY THE 
PROPERTY DIVISION IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING 23 
CONCLUSION 27 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Argyle v. Arayle. 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984) 7 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) 26 
Best v. Zutavern. 53 Neb. 604, 74 N.W. 64 (1898) . . . . 16, 19 
Blankenship v. Blankenship. 19 Kan. 159 (1877) 17, 21 
Bohl v. Bohl. 670 P.2d 1344 (Kan. 1983) 17, 20 
Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 
657 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982) 27 
Chandler v. West. 610 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1980) 23, 25 
Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314 (Utah 1945) 27 
Foulger v. Foulaer. 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981) 25 
Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) 7 
Gill v. Gill. 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986) 26 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Haven v. Trammel. 193 P. 631 (Okl. 1920) 17 
In re Adams. 29 B.R. 452 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982) 18 
In re Holtzhauser. 
117 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) 16, 20 
In re Marriage of Tiernv. 263 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1978) . . . . 18 
In re Reindeers. 138 B.R. 937 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992) . . . . 18 
In re Scott. 12 B.R. 613 (Bankr. W.D. Okl. 1981) . . 18, 20, 22 
Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) 20 
Kanzee v. Kanzee. 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983) 23, 24 
Kobriger v. Winter. 263 N.W.2d 892 (Iowa 1978) 18, 21 
Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) 25 
Lettieri v. Lettieri. 
654 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) 19, 22 
P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v. Bass. 
759 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1988) 15 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Panagopulos v. Manning. 93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937) . . . 19 
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . . . . 7 
Tabish v. Smith. 572 P.2d 378 (Utah 1977) 16 
Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co. . 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987) 6, 7 
Wierzchula v. Wierzchula. 
623 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) 19 
Workman v. Workman. 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982) 21 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (i) (1992 Repl.) 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (1992 Repl.) 15, 20, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-4 (1992 Repl.) 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989 Repl.) 20, 21, 23 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 26 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 26 
Utah Const, art. XXII, § 1 15 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions. Rules and Orders § 34 24 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah Code Ann. (1992 Repl.). 
The appeal is from a final judgment, dated August 14, 1992, of 
the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete County, State of 
Utah. Notice of Appeal was filed September 4, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUE I 
CAN THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION BE ASSERTED TO DEFEAT THE 
EQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY ISSUED A DIVORCE PROCEEDING? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the lien created in a divorce proceeding is superior 
to a homestead claim is a question of law. A conclusion of law 
is reviewed for correctness without any special deference to the 
decision of the trial court. Western Kane County Special Service 
District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 
1987). 
ISSUE II 
IS AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE A PROPER PROCEDURE FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF A LIEN CREATED BY THE PROPERTY DIVISION 
IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDING? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court in a divorce action has considerable 
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discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and property 
interests of the parties. The court's distribution of property 
is endowed with a presumption of validity should not be disturbed 
on appeal unless it is clearly unjust or a clear abuse of 
discretion. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988); 
Argyle v. Arcryle. 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984); Rasband v. 
Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), To the extent 
the question whether the nature of the proceeding is proper is a 
question of law it should be reviewed under the correctness of 
error standard. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d at 1378. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, section 7. Due Process of Law 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Article I, section 11. Courts Open--Redress of Injuries. 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article XXII, section 1. Homestead exemption. 
The Legislature shall provide by statute for an exemption of a 
homestead, which may consist of one or more parcels of lands, 
together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon, from 
sale on execution. 
Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-3-5 (1). Disposition of property 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
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in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree 
of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the 
dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, and order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the 
dependent children. 
Section 30-3-5 (3). Courts to have continuing jurisdiction 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
Section 78-28-3. Homestead Exemption--Excepted Obligations--
"Head of Family" defined-- Water Rights and interests--Conveyance 
of Homestead--Married homestead claimant--Sale and disposition of 
homestead--property right for federal tax purposes. 
(1) A homestead consisting of property in this state shall be 
exempt in an amount no exceeding $8,000 in value for a head of 
family, $2,000 in value for a spouse, and $500 in value for each 
other dependent. A homestead may be claimed in either or both of 
the following: 
(a) one or more parcels of real property together with 
appurtenances and improvements; or 
(b) a mobile home in which the claimant resides. 
(2) A homestead shall be exempt from judicial liens and from 
levy, execution, or forced sale, except upon the following 
obligations: 
(a) statutory liens for taxes and assessments on the 
property; 
(b) security interests in the property and judicial liens 
for debts created for the purchase price of such property; 
and 
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure to 
provide support or maintenance for dependent children. 
(3) The term "head of family" includes a single individual with 
or without dependents or a husband or wife when the claimant is 
married; but in no case are both husband and wife entitled each 
to claim a homestead except as otherwise provided by this 
chapter. 
(4) Water rights and interest, either in the form of corporate 
stock or otherwise, owned by the homestead claimant shall be 
8 
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exempt from execution to the extent that such rights and 
interests are necessarily employed in supplying water to the 
homestead for domestic and irrigating purposes; but such rights 
and interests shall not be exempt from calls or assessments and 
sale by the corporations issuing the stock. 
(5) When a homestead is conveyed by the owner of the property, 
the conveyance shall not be subject the property to any lien to 
which it would not be subject in the hands of the owner; and the 
proceeds of any sale, to the amount of the exemption existing at 
the time of the sale, shall be exempt from levy, execution, or 
other process for one year after the receipt of the proceeds by 
he person entitled to the exemption. 
(6) If the homestead claimant is married, the homestead may be 
selected from the separate property of the husband, or with the 
consent of the wife from her separate property. 
(7) A sale and disposition of one homestead shall not prevent 
the selection or purchase of another. 
(8) For purposes of any claim or action for taxes brought by 
the Internal Revenue Service, a homestead exemption claimed on 
real property in this state is considered to be a property right. 
9 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOSEPH WILES, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JEAN B. WILES, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 92-0459-CA 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the final judgment, dated August 14, 
1992, of the Honorable Judge Don V. Tibbs of the Sixth Judicial 
Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah. 
Joseph and Jean Wiles were divorced January 29, 1981. ( See 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact, hereinafter "Findings", at 2.) 
By its divorce decree, the court made an equitable division of 
the marital property and awarded Jean, the Defendant, certain 
property, including real property consisting of approximately 0.6 
acres and the mobile home which is located on the real property. 
(Findings, at 1-2.) As part of the property division, the court 
also awarded Joseph, the Plaintiff, a lien on the real property 
in the amount of $6000.00 plus interest at the rate of 6% from 
January 21, 1981 until paid. (Findings, at 2.) The Divorce 
Decree stated that if the obligation was not paid by the 
Defendant by December 21, 1991, the Plaintiff could foreclose the 
10 
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lien at his option. (Findings, at 2.) 
The Defendant has continued to reside on the property since 
the time of the divorce but has paid none of the obligation. 
(Findings, at 2.) On February 6, 1991, the Defendant filed a 
declaration of homestead with the Sanpete County Recorder 
encompassing the property which is subject to the lien. 
(Findings, at 2.) On July 15, 1992, the court issued an Order to 
Show Cause, requesting the Defendant to appear an show cause why 
the lien awarded in the Divorce Decree should not be foreclosed 
and the property sold to satisfy the obligation. (See Order to 
Show Cause, at 1.) At a hearing on the order, the Defendant 
argued that the lien could not be foreclosed because the property 
had been claimed as a homestead and was, therefore, exempt from 
judicial lien and forced sale. The court denied the Defendant's 
motion to dismiss, finding that this was "not a proper case for 
the filing of the Homestead Exemption." (Findings, at 2.) The 
court also found that allowing the Homestead Exemption to defeat 
this lien "would defeat the purposes of the Divorce Decree and . 
. .frustrate the Court's ability to divide the property in a 
divorce proceeding." (Findings, at 2.) Judgment was awarded in 
favor of the Plaintiff for $10,140.00, consisting of principle in 
the amount of $6000.00 and interest accrued from January 21, 1981 
in the amount of $4,140.00. The court also awarded the Plaintiff 
a Decree of Foreclosure and ordered the real property sold. 
(Judgment, at 1-2.) 
The Defendant acknowledges that the money judgment is 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
correct but appeals the foreclosure order. (Appellant's Brief, 
at 6.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION CANNOT BE USED TO DEFEAT THE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS AWARDED IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO 
THE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE 
MARITAL PROPERTY. 
The trial court in the present case held that the homestead 
exemption could not be used to defeat the equitable division of 
property ordered in a divorce proceeding. This issue has never 
directly been addressed by Utah appellate courts but has been 
addressed in many other jurisdictions. Several principles, which 
are consistent with Utah law, emerge from these cases. The 
principles dictate that property interests awarded to one spouse 
in a divorce proceeding be superior to the homestead claim of the 
other spouse. 
First, the homestead law is a family shield which should not 
be employed by either spouse to wrong the other. Second, the 
homestead exemption cannot be used to frustrate the power of the 
court to make an equitable division of property in a divorce 
proceeding. Finally, the situation in this case, where the 
Plaintiff's homestead interest was conveyed to the Defendant 
subject to a lien, is analogous to the situation where property 
is conveyed subject to a lien which secures payment of the 
purchase price. Purchase price obligations are specifically 
excepted from the homestead exemption. 
II. THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS A PROPER PROCEDURE FOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF A LIEN CREATED BY THE PROPERTY DIVISION IN THE 
DIVORCE PROCEEDING. 
After a decree of divorce is rendered, the trial court has 
continuing jurisdiction to make new orders for the distribution 
13 
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of the property as is reasonable and necessary. Therefore, it 
was not necessary that the Plaintiff file a separate action to 
enforce the provisions of the Divorce Decree and foreclose on the 
real property. £n order to show cause is a common proceeding to 
enforce the provisions of a divorce decree. 
The Defendant has not been denied access to the courts. She 
argues in her brief that she was denied the opportunity to 
request modification by the nature of the proceeding. But it is 
obvious from the record that the only reason modification was not 
considered by the court at any time during the pendency of this 
divorce matter is that the Defendant chose not to request it. 
The judicial procedure used in this case is based on fairness and 
equality, and the Defendant has not been arbitrarily deprived of 
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights. 
She has had her "day in court"; initially at the original divorce 
trial and subsequently at the hearing on the order to show cause. 
At the hearing she had the opportunity of being heard and 
introducing evidence to establish her defenses to the 
foreclosure. Having freely chosen not to assert her claimed 
right to modification of the divorce decree she cannot now 
complain that the opportunity was denied her. 
14 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION CANNOT BE USED TO DEFEAT THE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS AWARDED IN A DIVORCE PROCEEDING PURSUANT TO 
THE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO MAKE AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE 
MARITAL PROPERTY. 
The Utah Constitution requires that the "Legislature shall 
provide by statute for an exemption of a homestead . . . from 
sale on execution." Utah Const, art. XXII, § 1. The Legislature's 
response to this edict, the statutory homestead exemption, is 
presently codified as part of the Utah Exemptions Act. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-23-3, 78-23-4 (1992 Repl.). The exemption provides 
that "[a] homestead shall be exempt from judicial lien and from 
levy, execution, or forced sale." Id. at § 78-23-3(2). 
The homestead exemption is not absolute. According to the 
statute, the homestead is not exempt from lien, execution or 
forced sale upon three types of obligations: statutory liens for 
taxes and assessments on the property, security interests or 
judicial liens for debts created for the purchase price of the 
property, and judicial liens obtained on debts created by failure 
to provide support for dependent children. Id. at § 78-23-
3(2)(a)-(c). The statute has been interpreted to except all 
consensual security interests, whether they are the result of 
either purchase money or of non-purchase money obligations, from 
the scope of the homestead exemption. P.I.E. Employees Federal 
Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Utah 1988). 
Furthermore, it has been held that the homestead exemption does 
15 
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not protect property from execution where the underlying 
obligation arose from the debtor's fraud and the fraudulently 
obtained funds were used to retire delinquencies on the property 
claimed as a homestead. This is true even though the situation 
is not an exception provided in the statute. Tabish v. Smith. 
572 P.2d 378 (Utah 1977). 
The trial court in the present case held that the homestead 
exemption could not be used to defeat the equitable division of 
property ordered in a divorce proceeding. This issue has never 
directly been addressed by Utah appellate courts but decisions in 
many other jurisdictions have held that property interests 
granted to a person in a divorce proceeding are superior to the 
homestead right claimed by the person's former spouse. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court has ruled that the homestead 
exemption cannot be asserted to defeat the claim of a former 
spouse for alimony, stating: 
The husband's right to an exempt homestead cannot, we 
think, be asserted against the wife, who has been 
forced by his aggression to leave his domicile, and 
who, in an action for divorce, has obtained a judgment 
for alimony against him. The homestead law is a family 
shield, and cannot be employed by either spouse to 
wrong the other. 
Best v. Zutavern. 53 Neb. 604, 74 N.W. 64 (1898); see also In re 
Holtzhauser. 117 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990)(for the same 
reasons, a claim for child support is not defeated by a homestead 
claim) . 
The Supreme Court of Kansas has stated that "a lien upon a 
husband's property designed to secure the payment of court-
16 
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decreed alimony to his former wife will overcome a homestead 
claim," Bohl v. Bohl. 670 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Kan. 1983) (citing 
Blankenship v. Blankenship. 19 Kan. 159 (1877)). The Bohl Court 
went on to hold that a lien imposed to enforce a division of 
property will also overcome a homestead claim because !![w]hile 
the term alimony once represented the husband's common law duty 
of support and was a distinct concept from property division, 
modern decisions recognize the distinction has been eliminated 
over the years. The terminology use to describe the award is no 
longer significant." Id. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that "[t]he homestead 
law is a family shield, and cannot be employed by either spouse 
to wrong the other. Accordingly it is generally held that a 
decree for alimony may be declared a lien on the family 
homestead, even though title thereof is vested in the husband . . 
. ." Haven v. Trammel, 193 P. 631 (Okl. 1920). In reaching this 
decision the Oklahoma Court quoted an early Kansas decision 
concerning the power of the court to authorize the sale of 
homestead property to satisfy a lien for alimony: 
The power to take the homestead from the husband and 
assign the same to the wife, is the exercise of greater 
power than making a sum allowed as alimony a lien upon 
all the property of the husband, and ordering the same 
sold to discharge the lien. The greater power included 
the less; and we find no error as to the sale of the 
homestead . . . . 
Id. (quoting Blankenship v. Blankenship. 19 Kan. 159 (1877)). 
In Oklahoma, as in Kansas, the rule applies not only to 
liens for alimony but also liens that have been established on 
17 
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homestead property to effect property divisions in divorce 
proceedings• A Federal Bankruptcy Court in Oklahoma held that 
"it is clear that under State law, the Oklahoma homestead 
exemption cannot be used to defeat property rights and interests 
awarded in divorce proceedings to accomplish fair property 
divisions between the parties thereto." In re Scott. 12 B.R. 
613, 616 (Bankr. W.D. Okl. 1981). 
Court decisions interpreting Iowa law have reached results 
similar to those interpreting the homestead exemptions of Kansas, 
Oklahoma and Nebraska, but the decisions are based on somewhat 
different reasoning. The Iowa homestead law provides that a 
homestead is exempt from judicial sale "where there is no special 
declaration of statute to the contrary." Iowa Code § 561.16. 
The Iowa Supreme Court has recognized that Iowa Code § 598.21, 
the statute which grants Iowa courts the power to make an 
equitable distribution in a divorce proceeding, "is a 'special 
declaration of statute' which makes the homestead laws 
ineffective to bar judicial sale or other disposition of the 
homestead in adjusting the parties' property rights." Kobriger 
v. Winter. 263 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Iowa 1978); see also In re 
Marriage of Tierny. 263 N.W.2d 533, 534 (Iowa 1978); In re 
Reindeers. 138 B.R. 937, 942 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992); In re 
Adams. 29 B.R. 452, 454 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982). 
Texas courts have concluded that "in a divorce action a lien 
may be placed upon a spouse's real property homestead to secure 
the payment of the amount awarded to the other spouse for that 
18 
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other spouse's homestead interest." Lettieri v. Lettieri, 654 
S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)(citing Wierzchula v. 
Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981)). In 
Lettieri the spouses were co-owners of the property. The divorce 
decree awarded the husband title and possession of the home and 
the wife a money judgment as compensation for her interests in 
the property. At the moment of divorce the wife's ownership 
interest in the property was converted to a money judgment and 
the judgment specifically created her lien on the property. The 
court stated: 
The husband can clear the lien easily by paying the 
money judgment awarded to the wife. If he elects not 
to and the wife is forced to foreclose her lien, this 
in no way would harm the husband nor would it be a 
violation of the homestead exemption. The homestead 
exemption was also the wife's entitlement prior to the 
time that the divorce was granted, a right which she 
had taken away from her by the court, and for which she 
was simultaneously awarded a judgment lien as 
compensation. 
Id. 
Several principles, which are consistent with Utah law, 
emerge from these cases. The principles dictate that property 
interests awarded to one spouse in a divorce proceeding be 
superior to the homestead claim of the other spouse. 
First, the homestead law is a family shield which should not 
be employed by either spouse to wrong the other. See Best v. 
Zutavern, 53 Neb. 604, 74 N.W. 64 (1898). The purpose of the 
homestead exemption is to protect the family from destitution 
which could result from foreclosure or forced sale by outside 
creditors. Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 203, 69 P.2d 
19 
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614, 617 (193 7). The policy considerations in favor of the 
homestead law do not exist when the obligation which the 
homestead claimant seeks to avoid is owed to another family 
member, Utah's homestead statute explicitly acknowledges this 
concept when it provides that homestead property is not exempt 
from execution or forced sale to satisfy "judicial liens obtained 
on debts created by failure to provide support or maintenance for 
dependent children," Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (2) (c) (1992 
Repl.). The same rationale which causes the homestead claim of 
one spouse to be inferior to claim of the other spouse for child 
support or alimony, dictates that the homestead claim also yield 
to the property interests which are awarded to the other spouse 
in a divorce proceeding. See Bohl v. Bohl, 670 P.2d 1344, 1347 
(Kan. 1983); In re Scott. 12 B.R. 613, 616 (Bankr. W.D. Okl. 
1981); In re Holtzhauser. 117 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
1990). Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the Defendant 
could not assert the homestead exemption to defeat the property 
interests which were granted to the Plaintiff in the Divorce 
Decree. 
Second, the homestead exemption cannot be used to frustrate 
the power of the court to make an equitable division of property 
in a divorce proceeding. Under Utah law, the court in a divorce 
proceeding is "empowered to make such distributions [of marital 
property] as are just and equitable, and may compel such 
conveyances as are necessary to that end." Jackson v. Jackson. 
617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah 1980); see also Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
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5(1) (1989 Repl.). This power includes the authority to grant to 
one spouse an interest in property which was the separate 
property of the other spouse prior to the marriage. Workman v. 
Workman, 652 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1982). The power to take the 
homestead from one spouse and assign the same to the other 
spouse, is the exercise of greater power than making a sum 
allowed in favor of the husband a lien upon the property granted 
to the wife, and ordering the same sold to discharge the lien. 
The greater power includes the less and cannot be frustrated by a 
homestead claim. See Blankenship v. Blankenship, 19 Kan. 159 
(1877). 
The statutory exceptions to the Utah homestead exemption do 
not include an exception for "special declaration of statute to 
the contrary" comparable to the exception found in the Iowa 
statute. See Kobriger v. Winter, 263 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Iowa 
1978). It is important to note, however, that the Utah code does 
grant divorce courts the authority to make divisions of marital 
property. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1989 Repl.). The 
homestead exemption should be inoperative to the extent that it 
interferes with ability of the courts to exercise this specific 
grant of authority. To allow the Defendant to assert the 
homestead exemption in this case would thwart the divorce court's 
power to divide the marital property and cannot be allowed. 
Finally, the document which gave rise to the Plaintiff's 
lien was the Divorce Decree. It was this same document which 
operated to convey the Plaintiff's interest in the homestead to 
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the Defendant. Thus, it may be said that the property was 
conveyed to the Defendant subject to the Plaintiff's lien to 
secure payment of the Plaintiff's share of the property 
settlement. This situation is comparable to the situation where 
property is conveyed subject to a lien which secures payment of 
the purchase price. See In re Scott, 12 B.R. 613, 615 (Bankr. 
W.D. Okl. 1981). According to the Utah statute, a homestead is 
not exempt from forced sale to satisfy "debts created for the 
purchase price of such property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (b) 
(1992 Repl.). 
The Wiles were co-owners of the property, the Divorce Decree 
awarded the Defendant title and possession of the mobile home and 
lot and the Plaintiff a money judgment as compensation for his 
interests in the property. At the moment of divorce, the 
Plaintiff's ownership interest in the property was converted to a 
money judgment and the judgment specifically created his lien on 
the property. As phrased by the Texas Court of Appeals, "the 
homestead exemption was also the [husband's] entitlement prior to 
the time the divorce was granted, a right which [he] had taken 
away from [him] by the court, and for which [he] was 
simultaneously awarded a judgment lien as compensation." 
Lettieri v. Lettieri. 654 S.W.2d 554, 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
The Defendant could have cleared the lien by paying the money 
judgement, the validity of which she does not dispute. She has 
elected not to pay, forcing the Plaintiff to foreclose his lien. 
This foreclosure is not a violation of the homestead exemption. 
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POINT II 
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS A PROPER PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCEMENT OF 
A LIEN CREATED BY THE PROPERTY DIVISION IN THE DIVORCE 
PROCEEDING. 
The Defendant contends that the order to show cause 
proceeding denied her access to the courts. She asserts that an 
order to show cause is not a proper procedure for foreclosing a 
lien and that use of the order to show cause denied her the 
opportunity to petition the court to modify the property 
provisions of the divorce decree. There is no indication in the 
record, however, that the Defendant was denied the opportunity, 
either at the hearing on the order to show cause or before, to 
assert that her change in health would justify modification of 
the property division. 
After a decree of divorce is rendered, the trial court "has 
continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders 
for . . . the distribution of the property as is reasonable and 
necessary. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989 Repl.). Therefore, 
it was not necessary that the Plaintiff file a separate action to 
enforce the provisions of the Divorce Decree and foreclose on the 
real property. An order to show cause is a common proceeding to 
enforce the provisions of a divorce decree. See, e.g.. Kanzee v. 
Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495, 496 (Utah 1983); Chandler v. West. 610 P.2d 
1299, 1300 (Utah 1980). 
The Divorce Decree in the present case is dated January 29, 
1981 and provides that the lien in favor of the Plaintiff could 
not be foreclosed until December 21, 1991. During the ten-year 
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interim, the Defendant made no payments on her $6000.00 
obligation but, on the other hand, never petitioned the court to 
modify the Divorce Decree. The record does not reveal when the 
Defendant began to experience health problems. But presumably it 
was before she filed the homestead exemption on February 6, 1990. 
Thus, the Defendant's claimed change in circumstance occurred, at 
the latest, nearly two years before the date designated in the 
Divorce Decree for foreclosure on the lien and two and one-half 
years before the Plaintiff requested the order to show cause to 
enforce the lien in July of 1992. Rather than request that the 
lien be modified or set aside, however, the Defendant chose 
instead to rely on her homestead exemption. (See Appellant's 
Brief, at 12.) 
In July 1992, the Defendant was ordered to appear and show 
cause why the lien granted in the parties' divorce decree should 
not be enforced and the real property sold to satisfy the lien. 
The Defendant could have countered with an order to show cause 
seeking to modify the Divorce Decree based on changed 
circumstances, but did not. See e.g. Kanzee v. Kanzee. 668 P.2d 
495, 496 (Utah 1983). The Defendant had further opportunity to 
seek the equitable power of the court to modify the lien at the 
hearing on the order to show cause. The purpose of the order to 
show cause is to afford the responding party an opportunity to 
present to the court facts and reasons why the relief sought by 
the order should not be granted. 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules 
and Orders § 34. At the hearing the Defendant argued her claimed 
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homestead exemption as a defense to the foreclosure but did not 
request that the court modify the decree. 
The Defendant argues in her brief that she was denied the 
opportunity to request modification by the nature of the 
proceeding. But it is obvious from the record that the only 
reason modification was not considered by the court at any time 
during the pendency of this divorce matter is that the Defendant 
chose not to request it. 
Although the Defendant has never requested that the decree 
be modified, she argues in her brief that her affidavit in 
support of the motion to dismiss made a prima facie case for 
modification of the property provisions of the Divorce Decree. A 
trial court sitting in a divorce matter retains continuing 
jurisdiction to make such modifications in the initial decree of 
divorce as it deems just and equitable. Nevertheless, any 
modification must be justified by some change in circumstance of 
the parties. Foulger v. Foulger. 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981); 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989 Repl.). Where property settlements 
are in question the trial court should be more reluctant to grant 
a modification. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "property 
settlements are entitled to a greater sanctity than alimony and 
support payments in proceedings to modify divorce decrees." 
Chandler v. West, 610 P.2d 1299, 1300 (Utah 1982) (citing Land v. 
Land/ 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980)). 
Even if it is assumed that the issue of modification was 
properly placed before the trial court it is apparent that the 
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trial court was not persuaded that the Defendant's change in 
circumstance justified modification or elimination of the lien. 
After hearing the evidence the court ordered the lien foreclosed 
and the property sold. The trial court has considerable 
discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and property 
interests of the parties to a divorce and the court's resolution 
of those interests should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is 
clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Gill v. Gill, 718 
P.2d 779 (Utah 1986). 
The Defendant claims that the actions of the trial court 
denied her access to the courts as guaranteed by Article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution. The basis for this argument 
is unclear. The Defendant has not been denied "access to the 
courts." Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). 
As explained above, the only reason that the court has not 
considered modification of the Divorce Decree is that the 
Defendant has never requested such action. Furthermore, the 
judicial procedure used in this case is "based on fairness and 
equality", and the Defendant has not been "arbitrarily deprived 
of effective remedies designed to protect basic individual 
rights." Id. 
The Open Courts provision is closely related in both 
historical origin and constitutional function to the Due Process 
Clause of Article I, section 7. Id. Thus, the "remedy by due 
course of law" guaranteed by section 11 is similar to the "due 
process of law" guaranteed by section 7. Utah Const, art. I, §§ 
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7, 11. Due process requires timely notice and an opportunity to 
be heard. The Utah Supreme Court has explained the due process 
guarantee as follows: 
Many attempts have been made to further define "due 
process" but they all resolve into the thought that a 
party shall have his day in court--that is each party 
shall have the right to a hearing before a competent 
court, with the privilege of being heard and 
introducing evidence to establish his cause or defense, 
after which comes judgment upon the record thus made. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945). There are 
no decisions to indicate that the specific guarantee of access to 
the courts found in Article I, section 11 provides any greater 
protection than the general due process requirement found in 
Article I, section 7. See Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor 
Control Comm'n. 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982). 
The Defendant has had her "day in court"; initially at the 
original divorce trial and subsequently at the hearing on the 
order to show cause. At the hearing she had the opportunity of 
being heard and introducing evidence to establish her defenses to 
the foreclosure. Having freely chosen not to assert her claimed 
right to modification of the divorce decree she cannot now 
complain that the opportunity was denied her. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined that the Plaintiff's 
lien is superior to the Defendant's homestead claim. 
Furthermore, an order to show cause was a proper proceeding to 
enforce the provisions of the Divorce Decree. Therefore, the 
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judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted/^ 
Paul R. Frischknecht 
Attorney for Appellee 
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